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Filled Milk, Footnote Four & the First 
Amendment: An Analysis of the 
Preferred Position of Speech After the 
Carolene Products Decision 
Elizabeth J. Wallmeyer* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1923, Congress passed the “Filled Milk Act,” (hereinafter 
the “Act”)1 which prohibited interstate shipment of skimmed milk 
made with anything other than milk fat.2  A company was indicted 
under the Act for manufacturing and shipping a product called 
Milnut, which contained skimmed milk and coconut oil.3  When 
the case reached the Supreme Court, all the producers of Milnut 
wanted to do was to be able to continue to produce and ship its 
product across state lines.  The producers argued that the Act 
violated Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.4  The 
 
*  Elizabeth J. Wallmeyer is currently the Assistant Director of the Virginia Freedom of 
Information Advisory Council, a legislative agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia.  
She graduated magna cum laude from the University of Florida College of Law.  While 
attending law school, she concurrently received a master’s degree in Journalism and 
Mass Communications.  Her graduate studies focused primarily on media law and First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
1 Filled Milk Act, Pub L. No. 67-513, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
61–63 (2000)). 
2 See 21 U.S.C. §§  61–63.  The Act defined filled milk as milk, cream, or skimmed 
milk to which any fat or oil other than milk fat had been added, which resulted in a 
product that imitated milk. See id. § 61.  The congressional rationale underlying the Act 
was that filled milk constituted an adulterated food, the sale of which was fraud to the 
public and injurious to the public health. See id. § 62. 
3 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 146 (1938). 
4 See id.  The Milnut producers argued that the Act invaded the field of action reserved 
for state regulation by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which states that 
powers neither delegated to the federal government by the Constitution nor prohibited by 
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producers lost their argument,5 but their case impacted 
constitutional jurisprudence in a manner which far transcended the 
realm of economic regulation.  The resulting decision affected 
individual liberties, civil rights, and general questions concerning 
judicial activism and standards of review. 
This profound impact arose not from the text of the decision, 
but the now-famous Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.6  Written by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the footnote 
has been labeled the most famous footnote in constitutional law.7  
Justice Stone proposed the idea that a bifurcated standard of review 
existed for legislation, and that a narrower presumption of 
constitutionality existed when legislation appeared to fall within a 
specific prohibition of the constitution.8  In the context of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, this concept of heightened 
constitutional review became known as the “Preferred Position 
Doctrine,”9 meaning that attempted regulation of First Amendment 
freedoms was presumptively unconstitutional.10  The notion of a 
preferred position was embraced by the Court in First Amendment 
cases, although not without controversy, for about a decade after 
 
the Constitution to the states are reserved for the states. See id.  See also U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. 
5 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154.  The Court held that the Act was a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 
6 Id. at 152 n.4. 
7 See Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of 
Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 277, 277 (1995).  Linzer suggests that only two other footnotes have had such 
an impact on constitutional law: footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), which cited social science and psychological research 
supporting that the segregated education was not “separate but equal,” and footnote ten of 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), in which Justice William Brennan 
proposed the theory that Congress could expand the constitutional guarantees of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments (the Enabling Clauses), but could not 
contract them. See Linzer, supra, at 277 n.2. 
8 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
9 See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 24 (1997); Linzer, supra note 7, 
at 290. 
10 See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 24. 
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the Carolene Products decision, until it faded away after a scathing 
attack of the doctrine by Justice Frankfurter in a 1949 case.11 
This Article will briefly examine the status of the First 
Amendment and standards of review used before the Carolene 
Products decision in Part I.  In Part II, the Carolene Products 
decision, along with the history of the writing of Footnote Four, 
will be explained.  Part III will examine the cases during the 1940s 
that utilized the preferred position doctrine. Part IV will examine 
the First Amendment in the 1950s, when the Court appeared to 
retreat from the preferred position doctrine.  Next, Part V will look 
at the various theories that have emerged in an attempt to explain 
the rationale behind Justice Stone’s famous footnote.  Finally, Part 
VI will examine the current standard of strict scrutiny in an attempt 
to analyze whether it embraces similar values as the preferred 
position doctrine, or is a distinct means of examining First 
Amendment questions. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIOR TO CAROLENE PRODUCTS 
Today, freedom of speech appears to be treated as special, both 
“constitutionally and culturally.”12  The First Amendment, 
however, received little attention from the federal courts prior to 
World War I, and occupied a marginal status in constitutional 
law.13  In fact, until 1931, no one had won a First Amendment case 
in the Supreme Court.14  A notion of a special status for the First 
Amendment began to gradually emerge in the Supreme Court prior 
to Carolene Products’ Footnote Four, although the emergence of 
such a status was more implicit than in the later preferred position 
cases.15  This Part will briefly outline key Supreme Court cases 
impacting the First Amendment near the turn of the twentieth 
century and prior to Carolene Products. 
 
11 The “preferred position” label was first used in Justice Stone’s dissent in Jones v. 
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter’s attack 
appeared in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
12 G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free 
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 300 (1996). 
13 See id. 
14 See Linzer, supra note 7, at 300. 
15 See White, supra note 12, at 301–02.  See also BUNKER, supra note 9, at 21. 
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A few notable Supreme Court decisions around the turn of the 
twentieth century did not address the First Amendment directly, 
yet provide insight into how the Court might interpret individual 
liberties and regulations of those liberties.  In Robertson v. 
Baldwin,16 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute 
conferring jurisdiction on justices of the peace to apprehend 
missing seamen and return them to their vessels.17  The Court 
considered whether the statute might violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude.18  
The Court concluded that by abolishing slavery, Congress did not 
intend for the Thirteenth Amendment to apply to servitude to the 
Navy.19  The Court stated that the law was well settled that the 
framers of the Constitution did not intend for the Bill of Rights to 
present novel ideas, but instead codified the “guaranties and 
immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors.”20  
The Court went on to state that the Bill of Rights included 
exceptions to those principles.21  As an example, the Court cited 
the First Amendment.22  This amendment, the Court explained, 
provided for freedom of speech yet implicitly incorporated 
exceptions for speech that was libelous, blasphemous, obscene, 
indecent, or injurious to public morals or private reputations.23  
These exceptions were those that the Court recognized in the 
common law prior to the adoption of the First Amendment.24  
Therefore, any regulation concerning these presumably 
incorporated exceptions would not require a special or exacting 
judicial scrutiny, but would be justified restraints on speech. 
This idea that a restraint or regulation on a liberty such as 
freedom of speech would only be examined under a reasonableness 
standard was affirmed in the 1905 case of Jacobson v. 
 
16 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
17 Id. at 277. 
18 Id. at 280–81. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. at 281. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
WALLMEYER FORMAT 8/27/03  2:44 PM 
2003] PREFERRED POSITION POST CAROLENE PRODUCTS 1023 
Massachusetts.25  There, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
mandatory state vaccinations were a constitutional infringement on 
individual liberty.26  The Court held that individual liberties, while 
important, “may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be 
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable 
regulations . . . .”27  While this case may contain “the germ of the 
idea that civil liberties could be restricted only with some showing 
of necessity”28 because of the “great dangers” language, it 
nonetheless also asserts that such regulations must only be 
reasonable. 
The First Amendment was explicitly tested in Patterson v. 
Colorado,29 when a newspaper publisher was convicted for 
publishing cartoons and an article seen as embarrassing to the 
Colorado Supreme Court in its consideration of pending cases.30  
The Court treated the case as a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim, and viewed the regulation as an exercise of state police 
power, and thus not a violation of the First Amendment.31  Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, however, speaking for the majority, stated 
in dicta that the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent 
prior restraint, and not the subsequent punishment of speech.32 
An interpretation more analogous to current views of the 
position of the First Amendment began to emerge during the 
World War I era,33 when Congress passed legislation aimed at 
 
25 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
26 See id. at 12. 
27 Id. at 29. 
28 BUNKER, supra note 9, at 21. 
29 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
30 See id. at 458–59. 
31 See White, supra note 12, at 311 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet 
been read to incorporate the First Amendment to include state regulation abridging 
freedom of speech or freedom of the press).  But see Patterson, 205 U.S. at 464–65 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that a First Amendment claim was a national claim). 
32 See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (dicta). 
33 See White, supra note 12, at 312.  White credits Zechariah Chafee, Jr., as supplying 
First Amendment jurisprudence with its new philosophical rationale for protecting 
speech, by turning the focus away from the individual interest in self-expression towards 
a social interest in protecting democracy by facilitating truth in the marketplace of ideas.  
White draws these conclusions from Chafee’s 1920 treatise Freedom of Speech. Id. at 
316. 
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criminalizing speech designed to undermine the war effort.34  The 
Espionage and Sedition Acts led to a number of freedom of speech 
cases that made their way to the Supreme Court, and gave the 
justices the opportunity to focus on the First Amendment.  It is 
these World War I cases that began to lay the roots for the notion 
of a preferred position for freedom of speech.35 
In Schenck v. United States,36 Justice Holmes, writing for the 
majority, formulated the clear and present danger test.37  The case 
involved an anti-war group which mailed pamphlets to men 
eligible to serve in the military, asserting that the draft violated the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of involuntary servitude.38  The 
government argued that such pamphlets violated the Espionage 
Act, which forbade obstruction of military service.39  Justice 
Holmes upheld the convictions because he believed that they 
presented a threat to national security.  In justifying the conviction, 
however, Justice Holmes went beyond the standard of mere 
legislative reasonableness.40  Instead, he dictated that the question 
is 
in every case . . . whether . . . the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is 
a question of proximity and degree.41 
Justice Holmes continued to refine this test in a dissenting 
opinion in Abrams v. United States.42  The majority upheld the 
conviction of a group who distributed pamphlets criticizing the 
 
34 See Espionage Act, ch. 30, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917); Sedition Act, ch. 
75, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).  This legislation occurred during a period in 
American history known as the First Red Scare. 
35 See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 21; Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: 
The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U. L. REV. 462, 465–66 (1977). 
36 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
37 Id. at 52. 
38 See id. at 49–51. 
39 See id. 
40 See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 22. 
41 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). 
42 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
WALLMEYER FORMAT 8/27/03  2:44 PM 
2003] PREFERRED POSITION POST CAROLENE PRODUCTS 1025 
United State’s involvement against Russia’s Communist Party.43  
In reaching this decision, the majority utilized a “bad tendency” 
test which punished speech if it was of a type that would tend to 
bring about harmful results.  This bad tendency was less protective 
than Justice Holmes’s clear and present danger test.44  At the time 
of the case the United States was at war with Germany, not Russia; 
Holmes noted this fact in his dissent arguing that the Court should 
have overturned the convictions because the pamphlets did not 
constitute a clear and present danger.45 
In Abrams, Holmes opined that the government could only 
restrict speech if there was a “present danger of immediate evil or 
an intent to bring it about . . . . Congress certainly cannot forbid all 
effort to change the mind of the country.”46  In addition, Justice 
Holmes introduced the marketplace of ideas theory as a 
justification for protecting speech.  He wrote that “the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”47 
The Supreme Court again upheld the conviction of an 
individual associated with the Communist Party in Whitney v. 
California.48  Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, wrote a 
concurring opinion that read more like a dissent than a 
concurrence.49  Brandeis advocated the use of the clear and present 
danger test, and stated that the enactment of a statute did not 
foreclose the application of such a standard.50  He implied that a 
court could require more than a showing of reasonableness in its 
analysis of the constitutionality of a statute that might violate free 
speech.  Justice Brandeis voted to uphold the conviction on a 
 
43 Id. at 623–24. 
44 See id. at 628–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
45 See id (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
48 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (involving prosecution under a California statute prohibiting the 
teaching, aiding, or abetting of violence to affect political change, and not prosecution 
under a federal act. 
49 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1011 (5th ed. 
1995). 
50 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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technicality, however, since Mrs. Whitney had appealed her 
conviction on due process grounds, and not as a violation of the 
First Amendment.51 
Despite that a majority of the Court did not immediately 
embrace the clear and present danger test,52 the two justices’ 
continued advocacy of the test as if it were law raised a heightened 
awareness of the role of the First Amendment in both society and 
the law.  By introducing the theory of the marketplace of ideas—an 
idea introduced by early philosophers such as John Stuart Mill that 
truth would best be discovered through robust debate of all 
opinions—into the realm of the First Amendment, Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis were able to open the door to a stricter analysis for 
any government infringement on the freedom of speech.  Based 
upon the market theory, if the government regulated speech, it 
would hinder debate and therefore hinder the search for the truth.  
Such a notion provided a basis for the assertion that First 
Amendment scrutiny should involve more than a rational or 
reasonableness test,53 as was explicitly articulated in Footnote Four 
of Carolene Products.54 
Outside of the scope of the clear and present danger test, the 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the 
unconstitutionality of prior restraints in Near v. Minnesota,55 a 
decision which also influenced the Carolene Products Footnote 
Four.56  In Near, a newspaper publisher printed articles with anti-
Semitic overtones criticizing local officials.57  The publisher was 
convicted under a state statute which allowed a court to enjoin 
from publication any malicious, scandalous, or defamatory 
 
51 Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
52 See White, supra note 12, at 321.  Despite the efforts of Holmes and Brandeis, a 
majority of the Court continued to equate the clear and present danger test with the more 
traditional bad tendency test. 
53 See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 22 (citing C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 247 (1986)). 
54 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
55 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
56 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713–14, 718–20, 
722). 
57 See Near, 283 U.S. at 704. 
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periodical.58  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction as an 
infringement upon the First Amendment and labeled the statute 
“the essence of censorship.”59  The Court recognized that one of 
the primary purposes of the First Amendment was to prevent prior 
restraints; therefore, there could be very few exceptions to this 
principle.60  Implicit in this pronouncement was that any prior 
restraint would be presumed to violate the First Amendment, and 
would therefore require a much higher standard than rational 
review to overcome this presumption.61 
Up to this point, the Court had flirted with the notion that 
regulations affecting the freedoms guaranteed by the First 
Amendment or protection of the values it espoused62 would require 
a more exacting standard of judicial review.  It would take the 
Court’s grappling with economic issues for this idea to be 
enunciated in Footnote Four of Carolene Products, which will be 
discussed in the following Part. 
II. CAROLENE PRODUCTS AND BIFURCATED REVIEW 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene 
Products was significant in its implications for both economic 
regulations and individual liberties.  This Part will briefly outline 
the economic history leading to the decision in order to put the 
case in context for the reader, and will then focus on the 
development of the famous Footnote Four. 
A. The Economic Road to Carolene Products 
 Since the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision of Lochner v. New 
York,63 the Court had embraced a laissez faire attitude towards 
 
58 Id. at 701–02. 
59 Id. at 713. 
60 See id. at 716 (noting possible exceptions might include information affecting 
national security, obscenity, or incitement to violence). 
61 See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 23. 
62 As mentioned in the prior discussion, the marketplace of ideas had begun to be used 
as a theory for protecting the freedom of speech.  In addition, the Court enunciated that a 
core purpose of the First Amendment was to protect against prior restraints. See Near, 
283 U.S. at 733. 
63 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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regulation of the economic market.  The Lochner Court struck 
down a statute which limited the number of hours a baker could 
work.64  The Court found the statute unconstitutional, as it 
interfered with the liberty to contract between an employer and an 
employee.65 
The majority rejected the state’s arguments that the regulations 
were underscored by legitimate health and safety concerns, and 
had a rational basis.66  Justice Holmes, dissenting, believed that the 
Court was imposing its own economic theory upon the state by 
invalidating the statute.67  Such an action would arguably fall 
under the guise of legislating, not adjudicating, and thus violate the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Justice Harlan, the other dissenter, 
accepted the statute as a valid health regulation, citing the 
legislative evidence supporting the measure.68 
The principle that emerged from Lochner was that the Court 
would willingly void any legislation that it saw as infringing upon 
free enterprise.69  Such an approach, known as the substantive due 
process doctrine, is the means by which the Court voided 
economic and social legislation that affected the liberty to 
contract.70  Substantive due process refers to the practice of a court 
determining that a given regulation is invalid not because it 
violates a specific constitutional provision, such as the First 
Amendment, but because it deprives individuals of life, liberty, or 
property without due process.71  The doctrine of substantive due 
process became a powerful tool of judicial review for the Court, 
for it allowed the Court to infer an unconstitutional process for 
laws that violated substantive due process, thereby curtailing 
Congressional authority.72  As states and the federal government 
 
64 Id. at 63. 
65 See id. at 64. 
66 See id. at 53. 
67 See id. at 65 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
68 See id. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
69 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 376. 
70 See id. at 375. 
71 See generally id. at 346–62 (providing a discussion of the doctrine of substantive due 
process). 
72 This practice has been criticized as overstepping the Court’s boundaries and entering 
into the realm of legislation.  For example, when the Court ruled that the government did 
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attempted to regulate economic and social life in America, many of 
the justices believed they had an obligation to protect the economic 
marketplace from intrusion, and substantive due process gave them 
the means by which to accomplish this goal.73 
The Great Depression marred the laissez faire economic market 
and challenged the tenets of an unregulated market.74  In 1933, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the “New Deal,” which 
provided an abundance of social and economic government 
regulations and controls.  This economic activism, however, ran 
headlong into the Court’s adoption of substantive due process, 
creating a legislative and judicial showdown.  The spring before 
Carolene Products reached the Supreme Court, the makeup of the 
Court changed, and “the grip of the Court’s business-protecting 
block was irretrievably broken,”75 leading the way for a shift in the 
judiciary’s economic position. The Carolene Products decision, 
discussed in detail below, ushered in the Court’s new approach to 
economic legislation.  This approach essentially abandoned prior 
notions of substantive due process. 
B. The Carolene Products Decision and Its Impact on Individual 
Liberties 
In Carolene Products, the Court faced the constitutionality of 
the Filled Milk Act, which prohibits the interstate transportation of 
 
not possess the power to establish a maximum number of hours that an employee can 
work in a week, it decided on the grounds that Congress passed the law by an 
unconstitutional process.  Therefore, any government regulation involving the ability of 
employers and employees to set the terms of employment would be void under the 
constitution, thus eliminating the ability of the state or federal government to deal with 
these employment-related problems. See id. at 375–76. 
73 See id. 
74 See BUNKER, supra note 9, at 17. 
75 Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1093, 1094 (1982).  Lusky, a clerk for Justice Stone at the time of the Carolene 
Products decision, noted that Justice Black succeeded Justice De Vanter. Id.  In addition, 
the Court during this period ran into President Roosevelt’s “Court Packing Plan,” an 
attempt to allow Roosevelt to appoint more justices who embraced his policy of 
economic activism by appointing a new justice every time a judge of retirement age 
chose to stay on the bench.  While this proposal was still pending, the Court made an 
apparent retreat from its position on the constitutionality of the economic legislation.  
This retreat has become known as the “switch in time that saved nine.” See BUNKER, 
supra note 9, at 18. 
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filled milk products.76  Under the outdated notions of substantive 
due process, the Court almost certainly would have found the Act 
unconstitutional, as it infringed on the free economic marketplace.  
In fact, the trial court found that the indictment against Carolene 
Products failed to state a claim, based on the authority of another 
case in the same court.77  In Carolene Products, the defendant 
argued that the statute was beyond the power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce.78 
The Court found that the regulation was in fact a valid exercise 
of legislative power and upheld the statute.79  It cited congressional 
findings that included evidence of an extensive commerce in 
substances made of condensed milk from which the butterfat had 
been extracted.80  In its place, vegetable oil was substituted, and 
the resulting substance looked and tasted like milk.81  The product 
was lower in cost, but lacked the vitamins and nutritional elements 
found in regular milk.82  This substitution was therefore fraudulent 
and endangered the health of the public, thus making the Act a 
reasonable response to the problem at hand.83 
The Court justified the constitutionality of the Act based on the 
extensive congressional record.84  The Court broadened the reach 
of the opinion, however, and pronounced a general presumption of 
constitutionality for commercial legislation.85  Justice Stone, for 
the majority, wrote: 
Even in the absence of such aids, the existence of facts 
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for 
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless 
in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it 
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it 
 
76 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 61–63 (2000). 
77 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 146 (1938). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 147. 
80 See id. at 149 n.2. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 149. 
85 See id. at 152. 
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rests on some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.86 
Justice Stone attached his Footnote Four to this statement.  The 
footnote consists of three main ideas: first, that a narrower 
presumption of constitutionality exists when legislation addresses a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those set forth in 
the Bill of Rights; second, that legislation restricting the political 
process of bringing about the repeal of undesirable legislation 
might be subject to a narrow presumption of constitutionality; and 
third, legislation aimed at insular minorities might be subject to 
stricter judicial review.  The first paragraph of the footnote is most 
relevant to the instant discussion of the First Amendment.  The text 
of the entire footnote is as follows: 
 There may be a narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears 
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth. 
 It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation 
which restricts those political processes which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial 
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. 
 Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations 
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular 
religious or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.87 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). 
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The second two paragraphs of the footnote appeared as the 
entire Footnote Four that Justice Stone initially circulated to the 
justices.88  The first version did not mention the Constitution, but 
spoke to the dynamics of government and the interplay of the 
Court’s appropriate place in the scheme of government.89  Chief 
Justice Hughes responded to the draft, asking whether the 
considerations were really different, or whether the “difference lies 
not in the test but in the nature of the right invoked?”90  Hughes’s 
implicit assumption was that the recognition of certain rights by 
the Framers might legitimize a more intrusive standard of judicial 
review.91  As a result of this comment, Stone revised the footnote 
to its published form.92 
Footnote Four was adopted by only four members of a reduced 
Court, with Justices Cardozo and Reed taking no part in the 
decision,93 but this vote of four gave the opinion and the footnote a 
majority in a Court of seven.  Justice Butler concurred in the result, 
affirming the conviction for violation of the Act, but did not concur 
in the reasoning of the majority.94  Justice Black, a newly 
appointed justice who would eventually become known as a First 
Amendment absolutist,95 concurred in the majority opinion but for 
the third section, which contained Footnote Four.96  Justice Black 
expressed concern that such judicial action might exceed the 
 
88 See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1096.  Lusky, as Justice Stone’s law clerk, drafted this 
first version of the footnote.  See also Linzer, supra note 7, at 281.  Lusky’s original draft 
began by stating, “Perhaps the attacking party bears a lighter burden where the effect of 
the statute may be to hamper the corrective political processes which would ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of unwise legislation.” Id. (citing LOUIS LUSKY, OUR NINE 
TRIBUNES: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA 183, 185 (1993)).  Stone struck 
out this sentence, but kept the remainder of Lusky’s ideas. See id. 
89 See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1096. 
90 Id. at 1097. 
91 See id. at 1097–98 (suggesting that because of this specific mention, Justice Hughes 
meant that the ordinary dynamics of government and scope of judicial review did not 
play a role in their review). 
92 See id. at 1098. 
93 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 (1938). 
94 See id. (Butler, J., concurring). 
95 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 994. 
96 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., concurring). 
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Court’s powers of review.97  Justice McReynolds dissented without 
writing a separate opinion.98  Therefore, only Justices Stone, 
Hughes, Brandeis, and Roberts expressly adopted the language of 
Footnote Four, and Justice Brandeis would retire before the 
preferred position doctrine had a chance to be implemented in any 
subsequent First Amendment cases. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF A PREFERRED POSITION IN FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Justice Stone’s notion of a preferred position for certain rights 
began to impact the Court shortly after its pronouncement.  The 
position grew stronger and was mentioned frequently in the decade 
following Carolene Products, only to fall out of grace after Justice 
Frankfurter’s attack on the footnote in his concurrence in Kovacs v. 
Cooper.99  Throughout the decade, controversy arose over the 
authority to administer a heightened scrutiny standard, most 
notably in the sparring between Justice Stone and Justice 
Frankfurter.100  While Justices Stone and Frankfurter provided the 
most prominent division on the Court over the role of judicial 
review in relation to the First Amendment, other justices also 
played key roles in the adoption and subsequent apparent dismissal 
of the doctrine. 
The first use of the Footnote Four principle occurred the very 
next year in the Court’s 1939 decision in Schneider v. State.101  By 
an eight to one vote, the Court invalidated a series of local 
ordinances preventing the distribution of handbills on streets and 
sidewalks.102  Justice Roberts, a member of the four-person 
Carolene Products majority, wrote the opinion.103  His reasoning 
did not explicitly mention Carolene Products, but it embraced the 
 
97 See Lusky, supra note 75 at 1097 n.20 (citing correspondence from Justice Black to 
Justice Stone expressing concern over the scope of judicial review). 
98 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 155. 
99 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
100 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred Position 
Debate, 1941–1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 39, 70 (1987). 
101 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
102 See id. at 165. 
103 See id. at 153. 
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principles set forth in Footnote Four.  He wrote that a municipality 
may enact regulations in the interest of public health, safety, or 
convenience, but it could not abridge individual liberties secured 
by the Constitution.104  If legislation did infringe on these liberties, 
the Court “should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged 
legislation,”105 and should “appraise the substantiality of the 
reasons advanced in support of the regulation.”106  Therefore, the 
Court implicitly adopted the idea that legislation impeding upon 
First Amendment rights does not carry with it a presumption of 
constitutionality.  Justice Reed, who took no part in the Carolene 
Products decision, appeared to latch on to the Carolene majority’s 
approach to judicial review, as did Justice William O. Douglas and 
surprisingly, Justice Felix Frankfurter, both new members of the 
Court.  Justice Butler also joined the majority in both result and 
reasoning.  As in Carolene Products, Justice McReynolds 
dissented without opinion.107  After this initial decision, the bulk of 
the Court appeared to embrace the principle of a heightened 
standard of judicial review for the First Amendment, which would 
continue in the Court’s next examination of First Amendment 
legislation. 
The first explicit mention of Footnote Four came in 1940, in 
Thornhill v. Alabama.108  In Thornhill, a man involved in a labor 
dispute was convicted of violating an Alabama statute that forbade 
picketing.109  In overturning the conviction and finding the statute 
void on its face,110 Justice Frank Murphy, again for an eight-justice 
majority, cited the Carolene Products Footnote Four in discussing 
the importance of free speech in democracy.111  In addition, 
Murphy noted that when rights such as those embraced by the First 
Amendment are claimed to have been abridged, the Court must 
 
104 See id. at 160. 
105 Id. at 161. 
106 Id. 
107 See id. at 167. 
108 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
109 See id. at 91. 
110 See id. at 101. 
111 See id. at 95 (“[S]afeguarding of [First Amendment] rights to the ends that men may 
speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through 
the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government.”). 
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appraise the substantiality of the “reasons in support of the 
challenged legislation.”112  Justice McReynolds, in his last First 
Amendment case for the Court, again dissented.113 
While Thornhill implicitly stated that First Amendment rights 
should be viewed under stricter scrutiny than economic rights with 
the “substantiality” language, the term “preferred position” was 
first utilized by Chief Justice Stone in a dissent in 1942.114  In 
Jones v. Opelika (hereinafter “Jones I”),115 the Court narrowly 
upheld the application of a sales tax to the sale of printed materials 
by Jehovah’s Witnesses.116  The Court found that when members 
of the religious group utilize ordinary methods of sales to raise 
money, the application of a general tax did not prohibit the free 
exercise of religion or abridge speech under the First 
Amendment.117  The majority held that general taxation did not fall 
into the realm of the infringement of the exercise of a fundamental 
right.118 
Chief Justice Stone, however, speaking for Justices Murphy, 
Black, and Douglas in his dissent, found that the taxation did 
indeed invade the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.119  
In coining the “preferred position” phrase without specifically 
mentioning the Carolene Products footnote, Justice Stone wrote: 
 The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion against 
discriminatory attempts to wipe them out.  On the contrary, 
the Constitution, by virtue of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred 
position.  Their commands are not restricted to cases where 
the protected privilege is sought out for attack.  They 
extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 106. 
114 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) [hereinafter Jones I] (Stone, C.J., 
dissenting), rev’d on reh’g, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
115 Id.  The case combines three cases that deal with the application of similar city 
ordinances as they are applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
116 See Jones I, 316 U.S. at 584. 
117 See id. at 597. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. at 600 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
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is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of 
being used to control or suppress it.120 
The Jones I decision fractured a Court that had appeared to 
agree on a heightened level of scrutiny in examining legislation 
infringing upon the First Amendment.  This case forced the Court 
to examine general legislation with a secondary effect on 
constitutional rights, which was apparently not as clearly 
unconstitutional as legislation addressed solely at speech.  The 
majority, led by Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter, who had 
supported the Footnote Four proposition in Thornhill and 
Schneider, retreated to a more rational level of review in Jones I.  
In addition, two new members of the Court, Justices Byrnes and 
Jackson, joined the majority opinion. 
A year later, in 1943, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were granted a 
rehearing.121  The makeup of the Court had changed, with Justice 
Rutledge replacing Justice Byrnes,122 giving Stone a five-person 
majority for his preferred position argument concerning the 
taxation.  Justice Douglas announced the opinion in the rehearing 
(hereinafter “Jones II”),123 and like Stone’s dissent in Jones I, the 
Court relied on the preferred position argument.124 
The Court also decided two other cases addressing the First 
Amendment on the same day as the Jones II decision.125  Each case 
was decided with the same five to four majority that embraced the 
preferred position doctrine in Jones II.  Murdock v. Pennsylvania 
addressed a situation factually similar to that in Jones I.126  Instead 
of consolidating the case with the Jones II rehearing, the Court 
decided Murdock on the grounds that because Jones I had been 
vacated, the Court was free of its precedent and could “restore to 
 
120 Id. at 608 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
121 See Jones v. Opelika, 318 U.S. 796 (1943). 
122 See Currie, supra note 100, at 49. 
123 See Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) [hereinafter Jones II] (per curiam). 
124 See id. (relying on the decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), 
which the Court used to consolidate the Jones rehearing and two other cases because they 
involved the same issues). 
125 See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 105; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
126 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106–07. 
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their high, constitutional position the liberties”127 of those 
disseminating their religious beliefs through the distribution of 
literature.128  This case and Jones II, more so than the third case of 
Martin v. City of Struthers discussed below, allowed the Court to 
establish the idea that was general legislation with a secondary 
affect on First Amendment liberties was subject to heightened 
scrutiny.  Justice Douglas, for the majority, made that point clear: 
“it could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the 
exercises of [the First Amendment] freedoms would be 
unconstitutional.  Yet the license tax imposed by this ordinance is 
in substance just that.”129 
In Martin v. City of Struthers, the third preferred position case 
decided on May 3, 1943, the Court addressed the constitutionality 
of a city ordinance which prohibited knocking on a door or ringing 
a doorbell to distribute leaflets or other circulars.130  A Jehovah’s 
Witness was convicted for knocking on doors to distribute her 
religious literature.131  The city attempted to justify the regulation 
on the grounds that the city was an industrial community, and 
many of its inhabitants worked nights and slept days.  Therefore, 
solicitors would cause a disturbance.132  While not expressly 
mentioning the preferred position doctrine, the majority declined to 
defer to the legislative findings supporting the ordinance, and 
invalidated it.133  Justice Black, for the majority, wrote that the 
freedom to distribute information is vital to the preservation of a 
free society and must be fully preserved.134 
Justices Frankfurter and Reed each filed their own dissenting 
opinions.  In passing over the legislative findings, Justice 
Frankfurter accused the court of overstepping its judicial 
boundaries of review and entering the realm of legislation.135  
Frankfurter determined that the ordinance served a legitimate and 
 
127 Id. at 117. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 108. 
130 See Martin, 319 U.S. at 141. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 144. 
133 See id. at 147. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 154 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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reasonable end, and thus should be upheld.136  Justice Reed 
dissented on the grounds that the First Amendment is not absolute, 
citing obscenity, disloyalty, and provocation as established 
exceptions.137  He saw this regulation as an exception to, and not a 
violation of, the First Amendment.138  Justices Roberts and Jackson 
joined in Reed’s dissent. 
Later in 1943, the Court again addressed the preferred position 
of the First Amendment in West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette.139  The case arose out of a mandatory flag salute at 
public schools.  Again dealing with Jehovah’s Witnesses, students 
of the faith were expelled from school for failing to salute the 
flag.140  The students’ religion taught that the obligation of law 
imposed by God is superior to the government’s law, and 
considered solution the flag to be a violation of God’s law.141  
They argued that the regulation denies freedom of speech and of 
religion.142 
In invalidating the regulation, the six-justice majority held that 
the Bill of Rights withdrew certain subjects from the realm of 
politics in order to “place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by 
the courts.”143  Furthermore, “[o]ne’s right to life, liberty, property, 
to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no election.”144  In making this bold 
statement, the Court held that legislation affecting First 
 
136 See id.  (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
137 See id. at 155 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
138 See id. at 154  (Reed, J., dissenting). 
139 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  This case overruled an earlier case upholding a mandatory 
pledge of allegiance in public schools. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
(1940). 
140 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. 
141 See id. at 629.  Jehovah’s Witnesses adopt a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20: 
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image . . . : Thou shalt not bow down thyself 
to them nor serve them.” Exodus 20:4–5 (King James).  The Jehovah’s Witnesses 
consider the flag to be an image within the context of the Exodus passage. Barnette, 319 
U.S. at 629. 
142 See id. at 630. 
143 Id. at 638. 
144 Id. 
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Amendment rights must substantially advance a interest that the 
state may lawfully protect.145  Justice Jackson, a dissenter in the 
Jones II triumvirate of cases, joined Justice Stone and strengthened 
the hold of Stone’s majority on the Court.  Barnette, in retrospect, 
would mark the high point of the Court explicitly embracing a 
preferred position for the First Amendment. 
Once again, Justice Frankfurter dissented, and disagreed with 
the active role the majority took in reviewing the legislation.  He 
saw his duty as a judge not to impose his own policy, but to 
“decide which of two claims before the Court shall prevail, that of 
a State to enact and enforce laws within its general competence or 
that of an individual to refuse obedience because of the demands of 
his conscience.”146  The only question for judicial debate was 
whether the legislators reasonably had enacted the law in 
question.147  He admonished the majority for failing to exercise 
judicial self-restraint, and did not believe that the Court had the 
authority to decide that it possesses greater veto power when 
dealing with one liberty over another.148  Legislators, and not the 
courts, should be the ultimate guardians of liberties.149 
The final case of the decade decided under the Carolene 
Products Footnote Four preferred position for First Amendment 
rights was Kovacs v. Cooper,150 taken by the Court nearly six years 
after the busy 1943 session of preferred position cases.  The court 
upheld a conviction under an ordinance that prevented the use of 
sound trucks on public streets.151  The Court found that the 
ordinance was a justifiable exercise of the city’s authority to 
prevent disturbing noises.152 
The majority opinion is not remarkable; essentially, it declares 
the ordinance a time, place, and manner restriction that does not 
prohibit the exercise of First Amendment rights.  The tenuous 
 
145 See Currie, supra note 100, at 55. 
146 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 648. 
149 See id. at 649 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)). 
150 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
151 See id. at 78. 
152 See id. at 83. 
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majority in support of heightened scrutiny for any legislation 
affecting First Amendment rights, either directly or indirectly, 
again swung away from an across the board standard of a preferred 
position.  Justice Jackson returned to Frankfurter’s camp, and was 
joined by Justices Burton and Vinson, new members of the Court.  
Of interest in Kovacs is Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence, where 
he once again attacked the authority and intelligence of delegating 
a preferred position of judicial review for certain rights.  He began 
by calling the doctrine a “mischievous phrase”153 that had 
“uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this Court.”154  He 
chastised the Court for adopting as doctrine an idea set forth for 
inquiry in a footnote.155  Justice Frankfurter did not abandon the 
notion of more readily finding legislative invasion in the area of 
free speech than in economic regulations.156  He noted that Justice 
Holmes frequently followed this path by respecting individual 
liberties more than “shifting economic arrangements.”157 
Justice Frankfurter’s argument against the preferred position 
doctrine is not centered in a lack of respect for individual liberties.  
Instead, he rejects the notion of simplifying the “complicated 
process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula.”158  
In his mind, the two seemingly conflicting notions of respecting 
individual liberties and maintaining an appropriate level of judicial 
activism can be reconciled.  His answer to the appropriate level of 
judicial review is not to enunciate a test, but instead to defer to the 
legislature’s judgement so long as it does not discriminate or 
prescribe which ideas may be disseminated.159 
After Kovacs, the Court ceased to embrace the Carolene 
Products Footnote Four or the notion of a preferred position for the 
First Amendment in its subsequent free speech cases.  The next 
Part will examine what occurred in the First Amendment realm 
immediately after the Kovacs decision with the advent of the Cold 
 
153 Id. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
154 Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
155 See id. at 91–92 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
156 See id. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
157 Id. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
158 Id. at 96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
159 See id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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War, in an attempt to discern why the preferred position fell out of 
favor. 
IV. THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE RETURN TO CLEAR AND 
PRESENT DANGER 
With the end of World War II, the United States was thrust into 
the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.  Similar to 
the period immediately following World War I and the passage of 
the Espionage and Sedition Acts,160 the country entered into a “red 
scare,” or a fear of all things communist.  The antics of Senator 
Joseph McCarthy and his communist witch-hunt launched the 
nation into a paranoia.  At the heart of this paranoia was a fear of 
speech critical of democracy or the United States government, and 
the county entered a period of First Amendment suppression. 
In light of this historical backdrop, therefore, it is not surprising 
that the Court backed away from a preferred position of the 
freedom of speech and turned instead to perceived threats to 
national security through certain citizens’ speech.  In making this 
shift, the Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Vinson, 
returned to the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger test, 
forgotten for over a decade.161 The Court brought back this test in 
Dennis v. United States.162  Members of the Communist Party were 
convicted under the Smith Act for conspiring to organize to 
advocate the overthrow of the government.163  The Court affirmed 
the convictions, but with no clear majority.  Eight justices 
participated in the case.  Justices Douglas and Black, the only 
remaining Kovacs dissenters on the Court, dissented, while Chief 
 
160 See supra notes 33–48 and accompanying text for a discussion of this legislation and 
resulting cases. 
161 See supra notes 36–53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Holmes-
Brandeis clear and present danger test. 
162 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
163 The Smith Act of 1940 (also known as the Alien Registration Act of 1940) made it a 
crime to knowingly advocate the overthrow of the government, to print or publish 
information with the intent to cause an overthrow, or to organize a group with the 
purpose of overthrowing the government. See Pub. L. No. 76-670 § 2 (a)(1)–(3), 54 Stat. 
670, 671. 
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Justice Vinson commanded the four-member plurality.  Justices 
Frankfurter and Jackson also filed concurring opinions. 
Justice Vinson reintroduced the clear and present danger test to 
the court,164 but in a way that gave the First Amendment much less 
protection than the Holmes-Brandeis version.165  Vinson would 
first require the government to demonstrate a substantial interest in 
restricting speech, and would then require a showing that the 
restricted speech constituted a clear and present danger.166  This 
danger, however, need not be imminent and the government need 
not “wait until the putsch [rebellion] is about to be executed.”167  
Instead, a remote danger of a doomed attempt to overthrow the 
government would be enough for Vinson to justify suppression of 
speech.168  The test that emerged, therefore, was “whether the 
gravity of the ‘evil’, discounted by its improbability, justifies such 
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”169 
Justice Frankfurter criticized the clear and present danger test 
as being too inflexible,170 much as he criticized the preferred 
position doctrine in his Kovacs concurrence as establishing a 
presumption of invalidity for legislation touching 
communication.171  He used his Dennis concurrence to once again 
criticize the Court’s past use of the preferred position doctrine in 
an effort to elevate the First Amendment to a level of heightened 
judicial review.172  In fact, while brushing aside the preferred 
position doctrine as having been casually introduced in a footnote, 
he cited to the Carolene Products case to support his position that 
Congressional legislation should be considered constitutional if it 
had a rational basis for its adoption.173  Free speech, he said, is not 
an exception to the rule that the Court’s job is not to legislate, and 
 
164 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501–05. 
165 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 1014. 
166 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. 
169 Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
170 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
171 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
172 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
173 See id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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that Congress’s acts should be respected unless legislation falls 
“outside the pale of fair judgment.”174 
In light of Frankfurter’s concurrence, Vinson’s plurality 
opinion appears to cling to a glimmer of a preferred position for 
the First Amendment by requiring a substantial interest in 
regulating the speech.175  This preferred position, however, was 
watered down by Vinson’s interpretation of what was required to 
show a clear and present danger.  It was Justices Black and 
Douglas’s dissents that continued to embrace the preferred position 
doctrine, even if such terminology was not expressly used. 
Black asserted that judicial review for the First Amendment 
requires more than reasonableness, because without such a 
standard, the First Amendment would protect only orthodox 
speech that did not need protection from suppression.176  He wrote 
from the perspective that a preferred position for freedom of 
speech was a well-established constitutional principle, essentially 
ignoring the past decade of debate.  He concluded that: “There is 
hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures, 
passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the 
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they 
belong in a free society.”177 
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, also acknowledged the “exalted 
position” of the First Amendment.178  Black and Douglas’s 
adherence to the notion of the First Amendment as deserving a 
higher standard of review is reminiscent of Holmes and Brandeis’s 
continued reliance on the clear and present danger test as if it were 
established law during the 1920s.  Eventually, a majority of the 
Court came to accept the clear and present danger test as a tool for 
judicial review, as evidenced by Vinson’s use of the test in Dennis.  
Likewise, Black and Douglas’s continued adherence to a special 
standard for the First Amendment eventually resulted in a 
heightened standard of review for restrictions on speech. 
 
174 Id. at 539–40 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
175 Id. at 501. 
176 See id. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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During the period of the Red Scare, however, the majority of 
the Court seemed to abandon any notion of a special position for 
speech, and instead appeared to weigh the perception of any risk of 
danger against the speech the government sought to suppress.179  
As Justice Black hypothesized would happen in his Dennis dissent, 
future Courts steered the First Amendment back to a “preferred” 
position.180  It has been suggested that while the words “preferred 
position” fell out of use, the substance of Footnote Four still 
remained through the Court’s use of judicial tools such as a 
narrowed presumption of constitutionality, strictly construing 
statutes to avoid limited First Amendment freedoms, and relaxed 
standing requirements.181  The next Part will examine three 
theories that have emerged to explain why the preferred position 
doctrine emerged and disappeared as it did, and what role it may 
still play in First Amendment jurisprudence today. 
V. THEORIES SUPPORTING THE PREFERRED POSITION 
Several theories have been advanced in an attempt to explain 
the rationale and meaning behind the emergence of the preferred 
position doctrine.  This Part will explore three of those theories, as 
advanced by Louis Lusky, clerk to Justice Stone during the 
Carolene Products decision, and Peter Linzer and G. Edward 
White, both constitutional law scholars.  Each theory contains 
common threads with the others, but offers different perspectives 
on the creation of, and continued relevance of, the famous 
Footnote Four. 
 
179 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (affirming a conviction for 
violating the Smith Act based on the membership clause); Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298 (1957) (retreating from the broad doctrine of Dennis, yet not overruling the 
holding). 
180 Most relevant to the line of cases arising out of Dennis and Yates is Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).  In Brandenburg, the Court reformulated the 
clear and present danger test to avoid any sort of balancing of free speech issues by 
holding that any advocacy of violence would be protected by the First Amendment unless 
inciting imminent action.  This case has been cited as rejecting any deference to the 
government’s actions directed at speech that may have prevailed in the Dennis balancing 
years. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 1017. 
181 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 994. 
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A. Louis Lusky 
Louis Lusky played an integral role in the creation of Footnote 
Four.182  His unique perspective as a law clerk certainly can help 
provide insight into the mindset of the Court during the tumultuous 
period preceding Carolene Products, although his theory is not 
without its own biases.183 
The economic turnaround of the New Deal era presented Stone 
and his like-minded colleagues an opportunity to become the 
majority and guide the Court into the next decade.184  This shift 
raised a curious dilemma for the new majority.185  While they had 
disagreed with the prior regime of “government by judiciary” 
which presumed the unconstitutionality of economic regulations, 
Stone and his colleagues had taken advantage of the Court’s 
adoption of substantive due process to win a few victories in the 
realm of civil liberties.186  Here, as in the economic cases, a 
presumption of unconstitutionality was adopted, on the grounds 
that the liberties in the Bill of Rights deserved the same full 
protection as the liberty to contract.187 
Faced with the new majority in Carolene Products, civil 
liberties became a much more difficult issue because the Court 
would no longer presume economic regulations unconstitutional.  
Stone chose to address this issue in Footnote Four.188  Initially, 
however, Stone did not specifically mention the Bill of Rights in 
the footnote, but instead chose to focus on the dynamics of judicial 
review.  His first draft affirmed the need for both government by 
the people and government for the “whole people.”189  Stone 
 
182 See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.  As Justice Stone’s law clerk, Lusky 
was involved in the footnote’s evolution. 
183 See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 7, at 301 (asserting that Lusky’s personal involvement 
with the creation of the text of the Footnote Four “blinds” him in his subsequent 
discussions). 
184 See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1094. 
185 See id. 
186 See id.  Lusky cites as examples of these civil rights victories Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931), Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), and DeJonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
187 See Lusky, supra note 75, at 1095. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 1096. 
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unhesitatingly added a paragraph to address Chief Justice Hughes’s 
observation that textual rights might deserve more judicial 
attention than other rights.190 
The final version of the footnote, according to Lusky, arose not 
as a settled standard of judicial review, but as a starting point for 
debate given the new economic scheme of the Court.191  As the 
Court abandoned its prior use of substantive due process to 
invalidate economic legislation, questions would inevitably arise 
concerning the use of substantive due process in the realm of civil 
liberties.  Instead of ending the debate, the footnote sought to 
identify the new questions emerging on the Court, and “the modest 
hope was that the Footnote would catalyze thoroughgoing analysis 
and discussion by bar, bench, academe, and that a complete and 
well-rounded doctrine would eventuate.”192  According to Lusky, 
however, this theory underlying the footnote was never actualized, 
leaving the footnote and the ideas it presented to evaporate as the 
Court became involved in the issues surrounding World War II.193  
Linzer’s analysis of Footnote Four, to be discussed in the next sub-
Part, uses Lusky as a point of departure for his analysis. 
B. Peter Linzer 
Linzer’s argument speaks primarily to Lusky’s process-based 
theory of Footnote Four, and criticizes his reliance on why the 
footnote was developed instead of how it functioned to assess its 
viability today.194  In closely examining the opinions passed down 
by Stone and his colleagues during the preferred position period, 
 
190 Id. at 1097. 
191 See id. at 1098. 
192 Id. at 1099. 
193 See id. Lusky offers two reasons for the failure of the inquiry—the commencement 
of World War II and the advocacy by Stone of issues he felt were important. Id.  Lusky 
asserts that Stone attempted to win over his opposition by whatever means would be 
effective when he felt an issue was important, instead of unwaveringly following the path 
of sound doctrine. Id.  Surely a third factor could be asserted for the footnote’s alleged 
failure—the untimely death of Justice Stone in 1946, leaving Frankfurter alone on the 
Court to resoundingly criticize the doctrine. 
194 See Linzer, supra note 7, at 278. 
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however, Linzer draws the conclusion that Footnote Four and the 
ideas it encompassed were undoubtedly substantively based.195 
Unlike Lusky, Linzer does not view the internal process of 
Stone’s footnote rewrite to be an attempt at positing questions for 
future inquiry.196  Linzer argues that Stone and the Court did not 
see the footnote as a procedural suggestion, but “treated Footnote 
Four as stating a positive, not tentative, thesis, and one that dealt 
not merely with process but with substantive constitutional 
rights.”197  In reaching this conclusion, Linzer places emphasis on 
the first paragraph of the footnote.198  Instead of relying on process 
or discrimination to justify constitutional activism, as is suggested 
by paragraphs two and three, Stone relied on the Bill of Rights 
itself “as a charter for judicial activism.”199 
Despite Justice Frankfurter’s criticism of the preferred position 
doctrine, culminating in his Kovacs decision, and the subsequent 
fading of the term, Linzer argues that the concept of a preferred 
position has survived.200  The Carolene Products footnote helped 
to establish the enforcement of the First Amendment, a practice 
that became more widely accepted after the Stone Court.201  Unlike 
Lusky, Linzer does not see the footnote as a starting point for 
inquiry posed by Justice Stone alone.202  Instead, the footnote 
recognized a combination of all of the voices of the Court.203  
Stone began the footnote as an attempt to bury the outdated notion 
of substantive due process.  Lusky, as his clerk, pointed out that 
 
195 See id. 
196 See id. at 283. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. at 288. 
199 Id. at 290.  Linzer bases this conclusion on Stone’s lone dissent in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).  In Gobitis, the majority found a regulation 
compelling school children to recite the pledge of allegiance to be constitutional, a 
position later overruled in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  In dissent, 
Stone articulated that explicit guarantees of freedom of speech and religion cannot be 
overridden by a congressional command of loyalty. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 601 (Stone, 
J., dissenting). 
200 See Linzer, supra note 7, at 299 (citing Lawrence Tribe and Gerald Gunther as also 
supporting the notion that a preferred position of the First Amendment still exists). 
201 See id. at 301. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. at 301–02. 
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the presumptions that such a move would produce might, in some 
instances, undermine the democratic process.  And finally, the 
Chief Justice demonstrated that this rational review, without 
clarification, might ignore the nature of certain textual rights, such 
as the First Amendment.204  It is through this process that Linzer 
argues a substantive doctrine emerges that today functions 
implicitly in the widely-accepted notion that an action by 
government that restricts speech is presumptively 
unconstitutional.205 
C. G. Edward White 
In White’s analysis of the Carolene Products footnote and its 
progeny preferred position cases, he incorporates the Footnote into 
the larger question of what led the First Amendment to “come of 
age” when it did.206  He postulates that Carolene Products did not 
bring about this evolution, but was instead merely a byproduct of a 
“modernist consciousness” concerning freedom of speech.207  This 
new consciousness included elements of both democracy and 
capitalism, which he combines as elements of “modernity.”208 
According to White, the idea of speech as a special liberty 
deserving of special protection began to emerge in speech cases 
before Carolene Products.209  Along with this development, 
therefore, came the evolution of a bifurcated standard of review.210  
The switch to the presumption of constitutionality of economic 
regulations made the emergence of the bifurcated standard 
possible, but not necessary.211  This standard was enunciated, 
however, because a notion had already begun to exist that freedom 
of speech was a special liberty deserving of special attention.212 
 
204 See id. 
205 See id. at 302. 
206 See White, supra note 12, at 300–01. 
207 See id. at 301. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. at 302. 
212 See id. 
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As speech became more and more connected to the idea of 
democracy, the Stone-Frankfurter debate during the preferred 
position period illustrated that democracy could either support 
majoritarian, popular policies restricting speech (the Frankfurter 
approach) or could support an individual’s speech rights as the 
embodiment of freedom (the Stone approach).213  Through the 
many Jehovah’s Witnesses cases decided during that period, White 
asserts that it became clear that Stone’s perception of speech rights 
“reinforced democracy in a way that economic rights did not.”214 
White’s analysis indicates that a preferred position for speech 
really came to mean that First Amendment freedoms were closely 
associated with the model of democratic politics that prevailed in 
society.215  Implied in this notion is that unregulated capitalism 
was less democratic and less preferred.216  It is interesting to note 
that this shift occurred after the great depression, at a time when 
faith in the unregulated economic marketplace waned.  From the 
judicial rubble, the notion of an intellectual marketplace of ideas 
surpassed the economic model, and the preferred position doctrine, 
under White’s theory, appears to have legitimized the higher 
democratic values embodied in speech than in a free economy, at 
least during the decade following Carolene Products.  White 
continues to analyze First Amendment theory throughout the 
twentieth century, and also accounts for a later shift away from the 
marketplace theory towards a rationale reflecting a self-fulfillment 
theory of speech.217  What is important for the purpose of this 
analysis, however, is that the Carolene Products decision could be 
interpreted not as a major shift in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
but as part of the evolution of the role of speech in society as it 
“came of age.”  The notion that speech was special emerged well 
before Footnote Four, and the later abandonment of the preferred 
position doctrine does not signal an abandonment of a special 
 
213 See id. at 334. 
214 Id. at 334–35. 
215 See id. at 341. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. at 354–57 (citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION (1970)) (emphasizing the role of the First Amendment as a tool for self-
fulfillment). 
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position for speech.  Instead, Footnote Four was yet another rung 
on the ladder of First Amendment evolution. 
VI. DOES THE PREFERRED POSITION DOCTRINE STILL EXIST 
TODAY? 
Depending on which theory one espouses explaining the 
creation and evolution of the preferred position doctrine and 
Footnote Four, one could argue that Stone’s preferred position has 
one of three statuses: (1) the doctrine, intended to be a fluid 
starting point for inquiry, was suffocated by its static application, 
and faded out with the advent of World War II; (2) the doctrine is 
merely a step along a continuum of First Amendment evolution 
that emerged due to changing thoughts about democracy and 
speech, and melded into a newer theory as perceptions of the value 
of speech continued to evolve; or (3) the doctrine is alive and well, 
but has become an implicit, rather than explicit, standard embraced 
by both society and the judiciary. 
Some argue that the third status is the most accurate 
interpretation and see the preferred position doctrine as a precursor 
to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review utilized today by 
the courts.218  This notion is also supported by the general 
acceptance today that the First Amendment occupies a special 
place in society.219  The relatively quick evolution of the First 
Amendment from a tool prohibiting prior restraint to an important 
individual liberty in a matter of a few decades is highlighted by the 
advent of the preferred position doctrine.  Even if the doctrine does 
not explicitly still encase First Amendment questions, the ideas and 
values promoted in First Amendment decisions during the 
preferred position period continue to reappear today. 
How one decides to interpret the question of a continued 
existence of the Footnote Four ideas will also be partially shaped 
 
218 See, e.g., BUNKER, supra note 9, at 22.  Bunker argues that the Holmes-Brandeis 
clear and present danger test provided some underpinnings of the preferred position 
doctrine, and that the strict scrutiny test and the clear and present danger test can be 
reconciled. Id.  Logically, then, a relationship must also exist between the preferred 
position doctrine and strict scrutiny. 
219 See Linzer, supra note 7, at 301. 
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by one’s own notions of the appropriate standards of judicial 
activism.  In this light, the debate over the preferred position shifts 
away from the substance of the First Amendment and becomes one 
of procedure.  Such an inquiry extends beyond First Amendment 
implications, including notions of equal protection, unenumerated 
rights, substantive due process, and commerce clause powers.  
While a notion of heightened scrutiny for most First Amendment 
inquiries has become more widely accepted, the scope of the 
footnote extends beyond the freedom of speech to encompass all 
standards of judicial review. 
On a theoretical level, however, White is correct in noting the 
fluid nature of First Amendment theory.  Present trends toward less 
protection for hate speech, pornography, and indecency on the 
Internet cannot be explained by a static theory of the role of the 
First Amendment.  Society has, arguably, moved away from a 
marketplace of ideas notion that the truth is best served by 
allowing all voices, no matter how repugnant the opinion.  The 
Carolene Products footnote, on a theoretical basis, will only 
continue to be influential for as long as the theories that supported 
its creation continue to be espoused in some form. 
In reality, the continued relevance of Footnote Four most likely 
falls between the second and third theories of its development—
that the footnote was both a step on the evolutional ladder of 
interpreting the First Amendment and an implicit element in any 
discussion of the First Amendment today.  From a practical 
perspective, the footnote did help to illuminate substantive issues.  
Its reliance on the text of the Bill of Rights as a source for 
heightened judicial inquiry provides a reasonable explanation for 
the direction the Supreme Court has headed in First Amendment 
jurisprudence since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The many complexities of the issues raised by the Carolene 
Products Footnote Four escape concrete answers, but facilitate 
interesting and important debate concerning constitutional 
interpretation.  The foundations provided by Footnote Four for 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence shed light on the theory 
and policy behind today’s notions of the role of freedom of speech 
in society.  One footnote in an economic regulations case brought 
to the forefront of debate questions both substantive and 
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procedural, as well as questions concerning both the meaning and 
purpose of a specific amendment and broader questions as to the 
role of the Court and the legislature.  And the inquiry began with 
just a glass of filled milk. 
 
